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This chapter addresses the foundational place of the histories of conquest and slavery to 
American property law and the property law course. It begins by briefly reviewing how these 
topics have been erased and marginalized from the study of American property law, as 
mentioned by casebooks in the field published from the late nineteenth century to the present. It 
then shows how the history of conquest constituted the context in which the singular American 
land system and traditional theories of acquisition developed, before turning to the history of the 
American slave trade and the long history of resistance to Black landownership that its abolition 
fueled. This chapter suggests ways to correct for the tendency of traditional property law 
curricula to focus exclusively on English doctrines regulating relations between neighbors, rather 
than the unique fruits of the colonial experiment -- the land system that underpins its real estate 
market and its structural reliance on racial violence to produce value.  
 
 





 The task of integrating the histories of conquest and slavery can prove elusive and 
challenging for property law professors whose expertise lies in later eras of the field’s 
development. In this chapter, I describe the lessons these histories hold about the relationship 
between property and race and how I present them in the first-year property law course. Because 
understanding this relation has been substantially obstructed by the way these histories have been 
narratively erased from the study of property law, I preface this discussion by briefly reviewing 
the patterns of this erasure as they appear in the content of property law casebooks from the late 
nineteenth century to the present. The traditional property law curriculum in American law 
schools focuses largely on English doctrines regulating relations between neighbors, rather than 
the unique fruits of the colonial experiment -- the American land system and its structural 
reliance on racial violence to produce value. The development of property in the United States 
has relied heavily on racial practices, racial ideological formations, and racial violence since 
before the nation’s inception. The first English settlers who arrived on the shores of the eastern 
seaboard seized land from Native nations under a racial colonial mandate to produce property, 
and the slave trade they built and expanded entrenched a racial social order that would inform 
practices of trading interests in the land enclosures formed through the process of colonization. 
Below, I summarize my approach to showing how race has structured property and 
property law in America and offer a new frame for the standard doctrinal program, largely using 
materials already available in property law casebooks.1 I do not describe my entire course, but 
 
1 The casebook I require, which contains the best materials for teaching about the relationship between race and 
American property law is Singer, Berger, Davidson, Peñalver, Property Law: Rules Policies, and Practices, Seventh 
Edition (New York: Wolters Kluwe, 2017). However, I also draw excerpts from other casebooks by Dukeminier, 
Anderson and Bogart. See footnotes 41 and 45 below. The scope of this chapter follows a practical attempt to offer 
suggestions for building upon standard property law curricula now, when it remains relatively rare to teach these 
histories at all or in significant depth. It is not an effort to reimagine the property law course from the ground up, and 




focus on themes and points for discussion from units most relevant to the task of incorporating 
the histories of conquest and slavery into the course.2 While there are  many ways to address the 
history of race and property law in the United States, my strategy emphasizes the structural role 
of race in the broader system in which traditional doctrines operate.  
Before I taught Property Law for the first time, several people told me that designing the 
course was like assembling a train: you choose topics like cars that you string together as you 
please. This approach has meant that for generations of first-year property law students, the 
course has had the tendency to feel like a grab-bag of topics. Because casebook authors added 
the histories of conquest and slavery to their materials relatively recently, as I discuss in the next 
section, it is not surprising that these topics frequently appear to be optional cars of second-order 
importance -- less essential than, for example, units on estates, servitudes, adverse possession, or 
nuisance. Many property law professors do not choose to add these histories as cars in their train; 
if they do, may face challenges explaining the connection between these topics and the rest of the 
course. In part, these challenges stem from the fact that the materials on these histories are 
uneven in terms of both quantity and quality and across casebooks, which follows from the 
history of erasure and partial recovery that I describe below. I aim to show that the histories of 
conquest and the slave trade constitute the train’s track, rather than addenda to traditionally 
taught doctrines. These histories present more than an opportunity for apology or condemnation. 
They are essential to understanding what American property is and how it has been constructed 
by law. 
The arc of the course that I construct begins with the land system itself, and proceeds 
with background about the histories of conquest and slavery. The course opens, as I elaborate 
below, with a lesson on the recording system and recording acts, which I pair with reading about 
the history of the survey system, in order to establish that the course is about the study of the 
development of the unique American land system and the doctrines that operate within it. 
Introducing that system in its proper context— the history of territorial expansion and 
conquest—also aligns with the traditional first unit of a property law class: theories of 
acquisition, namely, discovery, labor, and possession. The racial framework of the Discovery 
Doctrine guided the formation of land enclosures and captive people as two all-important forms 
of American property. The history of the American slave trade was a fundamental part of the 
long history of colonization: the slave trade expanded with the territory, I explain, so that by the 
time of the Revolution, property in land and people comprised over 75% of all assets held across 
the colonies.3 Presenting students with this background lays ground for explaining how the anti-
blackness entrenched by the slave trade came to operate within the land system, in widespread 
resistance to Black landownership before and after abolition, expressed through the passage of 
racial zoning laws, the proliferation of racially restrictive covenants, the development of 
explicitly racial criteria in the Federal Housing Administration’s appraisal guidelines, and the 
racial inequities of the recent housing crisis. The content of these and other topics in the property 
law curriculum show, in my view, that histories of racial violence are so intertwined with the 
development of property in America that their omission has presented many obstacles to 
 
constructed this chapter to make it easy for property law course instructors to adopt my suggestions in whole or in 
part, with respect to a single topic or one class. 
2 The topics are, of course, very broad, and there are many issues that have shaped the history of property law that I 
do not discuss here, which are properly understood as part of these continuing histories and their aftermath: inter 
alia, allotment, fractionation and heir’s property, contracts for deed, antidiscrimination law, Alien Land laws. 
3 Alice Hanson Jones, Wealth of a Nation to Be: American Colonies on the Eve of the Revolution (New York: 




teaching about the fundamental structural elements, including racism, of the highly influential 
American land system that underpins the real estate market today. 
 
 
I. Historical Erasure in Property Law Casebooks  
 
 To teach about the histories of conquest and slavery in the first-year property law course 
requires speaking into a void left by a history of erasure. To be clear, a rich scholarly literature 
has explored many dimensions of these histories and their intersection, but the insights have 
largely not been incorporated into property law casebooks or curricula. While one could 
characterize the scope of erasure in casebooks by all this literature tells us about property law 
that does not appear in them,4 here, the metric I use for identifying “erasure” is simply the extent 
of the recovery of these histories in casebooks now: the long absence and late incorporation of 
the materials that provide fodder for classroom discussion of these histories—namely, the cases 
Johnson v. M’Intosh and the presence of an independent section, however brief, about the 
American slave trade.  
The monumental 1823 John Marshall decision Johnson v. M’Intosh clearly identifies 
conquest as the root of title to every parcel of land in the United States. Though nearly every 
property law casebook in circulation today recognizes the fundamental status of the case in our 
property system (and though it also appeared frequently in nineteenth century treatises), the case 
did not appear in a single property law casebook between 1888 and 1954.5 Instead, the first 
property law casebook by John Chipman Gray describes English feudal law in great detail6 and 
frames American property law primarily in terms of its descent from that system. This heavy 
emphasis on American property law’s English inheritance exemplified precisely the tendencies 
 
4 Materials on the headright system, land grants and subsidies through which governments procured the labor of 
settlement, and the Homestead Acts, the survey system, the Land Office, preemption laws, and the history of 
mortgage foreclosure, for example, were all instrumental to converting lands into real estate, and arose through the 
history of westward expansion and conquest. The legal system that facilitated the creation of property in people, if 
we look at that material process in a parallel fashion, would entail laws that regulated the construction of slave ships, 
castles, chains, and other technologies on which that trade depended to take people captive and treat them as chattel 
property, as well as the international and domestic laws that governed competing entitlements in the trade. 
5 K-Sue Park, “This Land is Not Our Land,” The University of Chicago Law Review 17 (forthcoming 2020), 20, 
citing James Kent, 1 Commentaries on American Law 242–43 (O. Halsted 1826); Joseph Story, 1 Commentaries on 
the Constitution of the United States §§ 2–8 at 4–7 (Little, Brown 2d ed 1851); Joseph Kinnicut Angell, A Treatise 
on the Right of Property in Tie Waters and in the Soil and Shores Thereof 41 (Harrison Gray 1826); Timothy 
Walker, Introduction to American Law: Designed as a First Book for Students 33, 147 (Little, Brown 10th ed 1895); 
Joseph Kinnicut Angell and John Wilder May, A Treatise on the Limitations of Actions at Law and Suits in Equity 
and Admiralty 416–17 (Little, Brown 1869). Minor citations to Johnson v. M’Intosh appeared in William L. 
Burdick, Illustrative Cases on the Law of Real Property 37 (1914) (reproducing a case involving the execution of a 
will, Barnett v Barnett, 117 Md 265 (1912), that briefly cited Johnson for the proposition that title was absolute) and 
John E. Cribbet, William F. Fritz, and Corwin W. Johnson, Cases and Materials on Property 24 n 2 (Foundation 
1960) (citing Johnson in a footnote for its holding that some traditional rules of property were inapplicable to the 
“savage[ ]” Natives). The text of the case appeared in the casebook 1974. Charles Donahue, Thomas Kauper, Peter 
Martin, Cases and Materials on Property: An Introduction to the Concept and the Institution, Second Edition (St 
Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1983), 30-37. 
6 John Chipman Gray, Select Cases and Other Authorities on the Law of Property Vol. 1 (Cambridge: University 
Press, 1905). For example, Section I of Book III about “tenure in general” describes the feudal system, beginning 
with the extract: “Thus all the land in the kingdom is supposed to be holden, mediately or immediately, of the king, 
who is styled, the lord paramount, or above all.” (307). The section goes on to describe the various aspects of the 




to align the legal and political systems of the United States with European traditions that 
Frederick Jackson Turner would critique just a few years later in his landmark essay, “The 
Significance of the Frontier in American History.” In this work, Turner famously wrote that “the 
peculiarity of American institutions is, the fact that they have been compelled to adapt 
themselves to the changes of an expanding people—to the changes involved in… winning a 
wilderness...”7 Further, he commented, in the process of westward expansion, the frontier was 
“the outer edge of the wave—the meeting point between savagery and civilization”8 and could be 
“sharply distinguished from the European frontier” by the fact that the American frontier lay “at 
the hither edge of free land.”9 Turner’s formulation of “free land” and the “wilderness,” too, 
performs an erasure of the racial violence of removal that this territorial expansion required, 
though we see its trace in his description of the moving zone of progressive conquest as a 
confrontation between “savagery and civilization.”10 However, neither this revisionist account of 
westward expansion as a triumph and achievement nor the underlying history of conquest 
appeared in Gray’s casebook, which laid the basic framework for subsequent casebooks for 
decades, and arguably, in some respects, to the present. 
 Though Gray neither described the uniquely American institution of slavery, nor the 
internationally organized process of capture and subjugation that made it possible for colonists to 
treat African people as enslaved property, slavery was by contrast an incontestable presence in 
casebooks between 1888 and the 1930s. Because property in enslaved people was such a major 
part of the history of American property, every casebook that appeared between 1888 and 1908 
contained cases either directly involving or citing cases involving property in slaves, which were 
used to illustrate doctrines such as conversion, statutes of limitation, replevin, trespass, bailment, 
and ejection.11 After 1908, most casebooks included several cases involving property in enslaved 
people; the number that did so did not dwindle significantly until the 1930s, when an increasing 
number of casebooks dropped all cases involving property in people. The last casebook to 
include such cases appeared in 1942. After this time, property law casebooks exhibited a total 
erasure of this history and form of property; in addition to omitting cases involving property in 
people, cases that cited such cases were edited to omit those citations.12  
 It was not until 1978, in the wake of massive social movements across the country, that 
Richard Chused published a groundbreaking casebook comprised of lengthy sections on 
 
7 Frederick Jackson Turner, The Significance of the Frontier in American History, (New York: Henry Holt and 
Company, 1921), 2.  
8 Here, Turner pointedly commented that “[m]uch has been written about the frontier from the point of view of 
border warfare and the chase, but as a field for the serious study of the economist and the historian”—and we might 
add, legal scholar—“it has been neglected.” Turner, The Significance of the Frontier in American History, 3. 
9 Turner, The Significance of the Frontier in American History, 3. 
10 Many scholars have elaborated on the euphemistic metaphors of “virgin land” for the genocide that occurred. See 
Henry Nash Smith, Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1970). For an account of the violence of this removal, see K-Sue Park, “Self-Deportation Nation,” Harvard Law 
Review 132, no. 5 (2019). The erasure of race, though not the history of westward expansion, is also visible in 
Turner’s description of the close of the frontier. As Turner recounts in the opening of his essay, in 1890, the U.S. 
Census Bureau declared the frontier formally closed because there was no longer land within the territorial 
boundaries of the United States occupied by fewer than two white people per square mile. Turner writes that “In the 
census reports [the frontier] is treated as the margin of that settlement which has a density of two or more to the 
square mile.” Turner, The Significance of the Frontier in American History, 3. 
11 Park, “This Land is Not Our Land,” (forthcoming) 22. 
12 Park, “This Land is Not Our Land,” (forthcoming) 22, citing Bigelow and Eckhardt, Cases and Other Materials on 




conquest and federal Indian law, slavery and racial discrimination in housing, and gender and 
women’s property rights. Joseph Singer followed with a widely adopted casebook that remains 
the standard for integrating materials about the themes of conquest, enslavement, and race in the 
property law course. But, even though the case Johnson v. M’Intosh now appears in every 
property law casebook, some of the most widely used property law casebooks today do not 
mention slavery or mention it only in passing,13 and only a handful engage the topic 
substantively, including Chused and Singer and his co-authors.14 
  
 
II. Teaching Property Law 
 
The fact that property law is already known to be an inherently historical subject 
facilitates integrating the histories of conquest and slavery into the study of the subject.15 
Furthermore, omitting the histories of conquest and slavery makes it more difficult to explain 
two crucial aspects of American property and property law— 1) the basic features of its unique 
land system that supported its real estate market16 and 2) its reliance on racial violence to 
produce value. These two aspects of property in America are both highly determinative of the 
character of American property and its law and likely to be intuitive points of entry to the subject 
for students, who will be familiar with and interested in understanding the rapid rise in rents in 
cities across the country and globe, as well as their deep racial segregation.  
 
A. Conquest and the American Land System 
 
Many property law courses begin with the subject of acquisition and frequently present 
the content in abstract, conceptual terms: for example, “discovery” justifies property interests in 
a contest between two claims according the principle of “first-in-time,” “labor,” on the basis of 
“desert” or a party’s “investment” in the property, and “possession,” on the practical efficiency 
of preserving the status quo. Historically and materially, however, the collective process of 
Anglo-American land “acquisition” from Native American tribes in North America entailed 
conquest, and each of these theories also played a major role in that process. The process of land 
acquisition and territorial expansion of the United States was large scale, but relatively brief: 
over the course of about a century following the Revolution, the newly formed United States 
invested a great deal of its institutional resources and energy into acquiring 1.5 billion acres of 
 
13 Dukeminier (e.g., mentioning a nineteenth century English anti-slavery judge, and “Slavery obviously was in 
opposition to that proposition [that “every man has a property in his own person”], but slavery as been abolished. So 
can we now say without qualification, that you have property in yourself.); Anderson and Bogart; Sprankling and 
Coletta. For descriptive overview, see also Park, “This Land is Not Our Land,” (forthcoming). 
14 Property law scholars Alfred Brophy, Alberto Lopez, and Kali Murray have compiled an excellent supplement to 
address this dearth of materials. Alfred Brophy, Alberto Lopez, Kali Murray, Integrating Spaces: Property Law & 
Race (Gaithersburg, Md: Aspen Publishers, 2011). 
15 Property concerns the history of claiming land, individually and collectively; historical events have deeply shaped 
property law; and many of its rules deal with transmitting property entitlements across generations. 
16 This system is still in the process of being propagated in countries across the globe. A wide literature is still 
proliferating on global land titling programs, influenced strongly by Hernando De Soto’s arguments that an 
American style property system is the key to building national wealth. The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism 




land from tribes to bring it under its own jurisdiction and onto the national land market.17 This 
massive transfer is a good starting point for pointing out different aspects of the study of 
American property and property law, especially the way it shaped both the material landscape of 
the United States and its institutions of government.  
More specifically, through the processes of territorial expansion and land extraction from 
tribes, the country developed its institutions for defining, organizing, and distributing property, 
and regulating a market in land. I teach students about this system in an opening unit that begins 
with a lesson on the survey and recording systems and proceeds to cover the three basic theories 
of acquisition that most property law courses address—namely, discovery, labor and possession. 
The crucial role of these theories in the formation of American property is a matter of historical 
as well as conceptual explanation, and covering this material creates an opportunity for raising 
questions about the society that grew from an economy founded primarily on trading the 
commodities of land and people, the material processes that continue to create property in land, 
and the role of racial distinctions in producing property values. 
 
1. The Recording System: Acquisition and The Survey 
 
Beginning the property law course with the land system that is the subject of our study gives 
students a basic understanding of the main features of the land system: the survey system, the 
registry, and the recording system.18  Not only did these elements of the system emerge from the 
process of westward expansion, but they also developed significantly with the creation of the 
primary and secondary mortgage markets and the financial crisis. The recording system, I 
explain, is where and how we store information about all the parcels of land that are subject to 
trade within the jurisdiction of the United States. It also provides a good introduction to the topic 
of acquisition: this feature of our system presupposes acquisition, since before we could map, 
measure, and record information about parcels, there had to be parcels; in order to make parcels 
for the purpose of buying and selling them, it was necessary to first acquire lands from tribes. 
Without this process, there could be no sale of land and therefore, no land market.  
In order to contextualize the establishment of the survey and recording systems in the history 
of westward expansion, I assign excerpts from writer and historian Andro Linklater’s engaging 
and accessible account of the history of the survey system, Measuring America. In chapters 11 
and 12, Linklater describes how the process of westward expansion and the land market created 
by the federal government were crucial to the survival of the colonies and the United States. The 
United States was bankrupt at the time of the Revolution, and the founders regarded the Western 
lands as the nation's greatest asset. Though they counted on income from the sale of Western 
lands to repay the debts of the United States, it is important to remind students that it is not 
possible to just claim lands still occupied by other nations abstractly: it is necessary to exert force 
to actually take control of them, and once in possession, the United States also had to take steps 
 
17 On the first day of class, I show the students a time lapse video showing the national territory at the time of the 
Revolution, and each formal land acquisition or cession by a tribe memorialized in a different treaty. As I explain, 
between about 1776 and 1871, when the practice of treating with Native nations ended, the U.S. entered into over 
500 of these treaties for land. As the video describes: “Between 1776 and 1887, the United States seized over 1.5 
billion acres from America’s indigenous people by treaty and executive order. The Invasion of American shows how 
by mapping every treaty and executive order during that period. It concludes with a map of present-day federal 
Indian reservations.” “Invasion of America,” The University of Georgia Maps, Accessed July 12, 2020. 
http://usg.maps.arcgis.com/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=eb6ca76e008543a89349ff2517db47e6 




to make the land marketable, or a thing that was possible to sell. It had to define the tracts that 
would constitute commodities on the land market, which it did by imposing the survey or grid 
system.  
Linklater relates the history of the United Surveyor General Jared Mansfield and the system 
of meridians, or the North-South lines he surveyed to construct an East-West baseline and draw 
townships.19 Linklater’s narrative points to parts of the United States’ landscape that students 
will recognize, which makes it possible to anchor the history he relates visually. I show my 
students images of the first Meridian, running up between Interstate 70 and State Route 227 in 
Ohio, just west of the Indiana border; of the U.S. Land Survey and township maps identifying 
the parcels that private individuals could buy and record; and of the straight-line borders of 
western states that correspond to these meridians, in order to show how the government 
developed the collective project of forming jurisdictions—national, state, and municipal—at the 
same time that it created individual property interests in land.  
Linklater’s account also furnishes excellent material for considering the survey and recording 
systems as technological solutions for establishing ownership and collecting information about 
the products of the survey, respectively. Using his narrative, I highlight three different 
technological challenges to surveying that produced irregularities in the grid, and consequently, 
difficulties in measuring, mapping, and recording. First, he emphasizes challenges to creating 
this basis for claims before the era of GIS and satellites posed by the terrain itself and the 
curvature of the earth. In vivid detail, Linklater describes surveyors’ ordeals on horsebacks as 
they tried to lay out chains on swamps or cliffs. Further, the way lines of longitude grow closer 
together as they run toward the pole forced surveyors to make corrections after every four or five 
townships stacked on top of each other, with new meridians starting back 50 or 60 yards east or 
west, producing jogs in roads and state lines. Second, Linklater describes how land had to be 
“pried away” or “squeezed out” of tribes, using euphemisms for wars. I underscore that we will 
return to the point that the lands were already inhabited in future classes; here, wars and conflicts 
with Native nations frequently forced surveyors to stop surveys and return later once those 
groups were vanquished in war or forced to leave their lands in other ways. Finally, Linklater 
describes errors as resulting from the fact that surveyors worked at breakneck pace,20 which 
raises the useful discussion of the reason for their urgency: that the nation badly wanted to put 
the lands up for sale to make money as quickly as possible, and that masses of land hungry 
European migrants were already in the process of moving onto the land and demanding to buy 
it.21 This point sets up future discussions on the role of squatters and federally created incentives 
to settlement,22 which will recur in teaching the doctrine of adverse possession.  
Beginning my course by focusing on the process of defining ownership entitlements and 
collecting this information helps me establish a context for a lesson on the recording system and 
the recording act rules. In order to make students aware of the contemporary stakes of this 
history, I do two additional things during this first class. To give them a hands-on understanding 
of how the recording system works today, I lead them through an exercise of searching for a 
 
19 Andro Linklater, Measuring America: How an Untamed Wilderness Shaped the United States and Fulfilled the 
Promise of Democracy (New York: Walker Books, 2002), 160 ff. 
20 Linklater, Measuring America, 162-63. 
21 Linklater, Measuring America, 163. 
22 Such as the Homestead Act and the series of Land Acts that reduced the size of individual claims to increase their 




specific property transaction that took place in Chicago in the 1990s.23 Second, while discussing 
how important the formation of the land market was in the nation’s history, I also emphasize that 
this land market never ceased growing and still constitutes an enormous part of the overall 
national economy. To underscore the contemporary stakes of the system, I share some figures 
with the students: that in 2018, the U.S. residential housing market was worth $34 trillion; 24 that 
real estate now constitutes 60% of global mainstream assets; that the unique land system that 
promoted this growth is an American phenomenon developed during and for the process of 
territorial expansion, and that this American phenomenon is now a model for export as the global 
speculative real estate market continues to grow. 
 




Theories of acquisition, in the property law course, offer legal justifications for who holds 
title to property in land (as surveyed and recorded by the processes discussed above). 
Acquisition, however, is a euphemistic way of describing expropriation, and can obscure the 
history of expropriation in which it is rooted when taught without reference to American history. 
However, Johnson v. M’Intosh, which articulates the Discovery Doctrine in the property law 
canon, clearly describes how the first-in-time principle operated during the historical process of 
collective colonial land acquisition from Native nations. Furthermore, that history foregrounds 
the racial structure of the law that facilitated that initial transfer and it names that process as 
conquest.25 It also develops the conversation about chains of title by describing how intra-
European sovereign chains of title determine individual chains of title.26  
The Discovery Doctrine governed the European project of enslaving non-European people 
and colonizing their lands for centuries. The documents that developed the doctrine include the 
papal bulls Dum Diversas (1452) and Romanus Pontifex (1455), which authorized the 
Portuguese to enter lands in West Africa and build their slave trade, and the Inter Caetera (1493) 
 
23 I use an exercise in the book “Real Property for the Real World” which asks students to search for musician Kurt 
Elling’s sale of a condo to a family that turns out to be the Obamas. Here, you can emphasize the local 
administration of registry websites, and the consequent variations in whether records are included online or not, and 
the various sorts of searches they support or do not; several of my students noticed, in keeping with the theme of 
technology, that the Cook County website seemed to be very old and did not work very well. Heather Way, Lucille 
Wood, Tanya Marsh, Real Property for the Real World: Building Skills Through Case Study (St Paul: Foundation 
Press, 2017), 3.  
24 “Derivation of U.S. Net Wealth,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Financial Accounts Guide, 
2020 Q1. https://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/fof/displaytable.aspx?t=b.1 
25 This decision is historical both in its significance and its content, making it difficult to simply extract an abstract 
principle of “first in time” and not discuss its historical context and the moral questions it raises. Although some 
teachers may therefore choose to omit it from the course, it furnishes an excellent opportunity to discuss how 
abstract principles that, like the principle of “first in time,” appear based on fairness, arise from complex material 
circumstances that contain other lessons for understanding property law. 
26 Many property law professors teach Johnson together with Popov v. Hayashi, a case about catching a baseball at a 
game, to deal with the concept of discovery. While it is surely appealing to teach cases about baseballs and news 
services (see discussion of INS v. Associated Press, infra, p. 12), I balance that temptation against the serious 
challenge of providing a basic background of the 400 year history of colonization and enslavement, which I consider 
essential for explaining the structure of the land system and its racial dynamics, in the three weeks I dedicate to 
covering theories of acquisition, the recording system, and adverse possession. Popov v. Hayashi, 2002 WL 




and the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494), which demarcated the zones of the Atlantic that Spain and 
Portugal could invade without interference from one another. As Marshall describes in Johnson, 
the Dutch, French, and English all launched their colonizing expeditions under this principle 
during the next centuries. The Doctrine relied on a fundamental racial distinction27 between 
Europeans and non-Europeans to impose a “first in time” principle between European nations 
vis-à-vis their rights to attempt to subjugate non-Europeans. Chief Justice John Marshall clearly 
explains that the Discovery Doctrine was intended to reduce conflicts between European nations 
in competition with one another28: the first Europeans to arrive in a non-European land, he 
writes, had “the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives and establishing settlements 
upon it. It was a right with which no Europeans could interfere.”29 As I will describe, this racial 
distinction created a hierarchical order of international sovereignty: it informed European 
colonists’ treatment of Native peoples on the ground as they sought to realize their discovery 
claims, and it created specific kinds of value for colonial markets that materialized upon the 
transfer of resources from Native nations to colonists. There is therefore no clearer description of 
the structural racial determinants of American property than that which appears in Johnson.   
As Johnson concerns collective land acquisition (how a nation acquires its entitlements to 
land in the first place), the case is also, as most teachers already likely point out, about the 
relationship between property and sovereignty. The lesson that property and property law flow 
from sovereignty is useful to establish early in the course as a basis for explaining the 
government role in shaping the property system, and especially for topics that typically appear 
later in the course like zoning and eminent domain. Again, Johnson describes the source of this 
sovereignty (and therefore the authority for these types of government action) as the international 
law principle of discovery, which determined collective chains of title allocating entitlements 
between sovereigns: in his decision, Marshall emphasizes European claims by conquest—from 
Britain, Spain, and France-- passing to the United States under this order. That chain of 
sovereign title, under the racial principle of Discovery, excludes the sovereign claims of Native 
nations. Thus, he concludes that the United States “have unequivocally acceded to that great and 
broad rule by which its civilized inhabitants now hold this country”; and famously also, that 
“Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny.”30  
 
27 The rationales for the Discovery Doctrine, in its various iterations, were civilizational, cultural, and religious 
differences. See Robert Williams, The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourses of Conquest, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). These distinctions were more explicitly elaborated as racial on the 
ground; see K-Sue Park, “Race, Innovation and Financial Growth, The Example of Foreclosure,” (forthcoming in 
Destin Jenkins and Justin Leroy eds. Histories of Racial Capitalism (2020)); Nancy Shoemaker, A Strange Likeness: 
Becoming Red and White in Eighteenth Century North America (2004). 
28 Note that by this time, the Doctrine of Discovery was a governing principle for several centuries, and it 
transformed considerably over these centuries. In my class, I also give students the example of the Papal Bulls and 
their allocation of interests between Spain and Portugal to illustrate previous ways the Doctrine was mobilized to 
reduce competition between European nations and subsequently shaped the world. See Robert Miller, Jacinta Ruru, 
Larissa Behrendt, Tracey Lindberg, Discovering Indigenous Lands: The Doctrine of Discovery in the English 
Colonies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 1-2; see also Brian Slattery, “Paper Empires: The Legal 
Dimensions of French and English Ventures in North America,” in In John McLaren, A.R. Buck and Nancy E. 
Wright, eds. Despotic Dominion: Property Rights in British Settler Societies (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 2005), 50-78. 
29 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 573 (1823); the case is also printed in the casebook I use, Singer et al., 
Property Law, 31.  




As Marshall acknowledged, the sovereign presence and claims of Native nations posed a 
material challenge to these intra-European claims: “the whole of the territory, in the letters patent 
described… was held, occupied, and possessed in full sovereignty, by various independent tribes 
or nations of Indians, who were the sovereigns of their respective portions of the territory, and 
the absolute owners and proprietors of the soil; and who neither acknowledged nor owed any 
allegiance or obedience to any European sovereign or state whatever.” Conquest therefore 
necessarily entailed more than just the formal claim under the principle of discovery. Marshall 
articulated the full rule as a two-stage process, “This principle was, that discovery gave title to 
the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority it was made, against all other 
European governments, which title might be consummated by possession.”31 First, a European 
sovereign made first-in-time “discovery” claims; second, its representatives needed to take actual 
possession of the lands thereby claimed, by removing, destroying, or subordinating Native 
inhabitants to extinguish their competing claims.  
Acquisition, therefore, has been a euphemistic way of describing expropriation; Under the 
principle of discovery, no other European nation could disturb the discoverer in taking 
“possession”32 to “consummate” title33: as Marshall wrote, the relations between the discoverer 
and Native nations were to be regulated by themselves; “The Rights thus acquired being 
exclusive, no other power could interpose between them.”34 As a result, Marshall continues, the 
United States “maintain, as all others have maintained, that discovery gave an exclusive right to 
extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest.”35 This point raises 
a) the historical question of what British colonists actually did to take control of land in 
North America—purchase, in addition to outright force36;  
b) the legal question of how colonists’ action in pursuit of possession would impact their 
claims to title later, arguably the main question of Johnson itself;  
c) and the conceptual question about the impact of this condition on the first, formal claim.  
That is, the condition of actual possession renders the formal first in time claim a preemption or 
an option right—an option to try to take the lands from its indigenous inhabitants. 
In a contest between sovereignties, the prevailing sovereign determines what property is and 
how to allocate and enforce property rights,37 including the rules for determining individual 
chains of title—the heart of the dispute in this case. The case presents a dispute over competing 
claims to title between parties that purchased from the U.S. government (M’Intosh)38 and 
inherited from the Illinois and Wabash Land Company, which purchased directly from the 
Piankeshaw and Illinois Nations.39 Marshall’s question presented asks about “the power of 
 
31 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573; italics mine. Printed in Singer et al., Property Law, 91. 
32 Here, you can anticipate a future lesson on “possession” and the lesson of Pierson v. Post by defining it as “taking 
control.”  
33 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573, printed in Singer et al., Property Law, 93. 
34 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573, printed in Singer et al., Property Law, 91. 
35 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 587, printed in Singer et al., Property Law, 92.  
36 See sections on labor and possession below. 
37 At this juncture, it may be worth establishing that the sovereign retains rights over privately owned land in 
anticipation of future lessons on the public regulation of lands.  
38 Which purchased it from the Illinois and Piankeshaw tribes. Governor William Henry Harrison, later president, 
negotiated the 1803 treaties under which M’Intosh claimed, by first obtaining the consent of tribes in the area 
without strong claims to the lands, and then used that consent to pressure other tribes to sign. The U.S. obtained the 
signatures for those treaties without paying any tribes anything at all. [source?] 
39 Murray and Viviat, the individuals who negotiated those purchases, chose strategically to deal with the 




Indians to give, and of private individuals to receive a title which can be sustained in the Courts 
of this country”—that is, the parameters of Native title excluded from chains of title between 
European sovereigns constructed under the principle of discovery.40 Marshall resolved the 
question by subordinating Native property interests to European interests in keeping with the 
racial hierarchy of the Discovery Doctrine: tribes held a mere “right of occupancy,” he held, 
subject to the “ultimate dominion” acquired by a European nation through conquest. In doing so, 
he ignored a centuries old colonial practice of private individuals purchasing land directly from 
tribes and instead affirmed the U.S. rule under the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, which 
limited Native nations’ ability to sell land to any party other than the U.S. government.41  
Some casebooks have used Johnson to focus on the certainty that property rules create that 
allows transactions to continue or occur more “efficiently” because the rules can be “easily 
administered and applied,” and therefore contribute to “peace and order.”42 I ask my students to 
identify the object of efficiency in order to point out that rules that promote property transactions 
may not also efficiently serve other possible goals of property systems, such as providing 
universal shelter, subsistence, and other public goods. This emphasis on economic interests43 is 
 
also claimed the same land. The land claims supposedly conflicted, but casebooks already include maps of the 
parcels in question that show that the claims of Johnson and M’Intosh were not actually in conflict, and the case was 
a case of collusion intended to produce an answer on the legal question of valid chains of title. Singer et al., 
Property Law, 95. See also Lindsay Robertson, Conquest by Law: How the Discovery of America Dispossessed 
Indigenous Peoples of Their Lands (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).  
40 Tellingly, Johnson argued that the Piankeshaw were the owners of the lands in dispute, and that their power to sell 
was confirmed by longstanding colonial practices of purchasing lands directly from Native nations. Consequently, 
as his attorney notes, “all, or nearly all, the lands in the United States, is holden under purchases from the Indian 
nations.” Johnson, 21 U.S. at 563; Singer et al., Property Law, 8. M’Intosh, on the other hand, argued for the 
exclusion of such claims under the principle of discovery: the “uniform understanding and practice of European 
nations, and the settled law, as laid down by the tribunals of the civilized states, denied the right of the Indians to be 
considered as independent communities, having a permanent property in the soil, capable of alienation to private 
individuals. They remain in a state of nature, and have never been admitted into the general society of nations.” 
Johnson, 21 U.S. at 567;  Singer et al., Property Law, 9. 
41 Stuart Banner, How the Indians Lost their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier (2005) 39-43 ff [highlighting 
that the English respected Indian property rights and continued to do so because their chain of titles originated with 
purchases from the Indians]. Direct purchase from tribes was a widespread practice throughout the colonial period. 
The Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790 was especially significant because colonists had resoundingly refused the 
identical prohibition on private purchases of Native nations’ lands that King George III tried to impose upon them in 
the Proclamation. Many people continued to make private purchases of Native nations’ lands in violation of the 
Proclamation (including, famously George Washington); Marshall might have invalidated Johnson’s claim on these 
narrower grounds. The Trade and Intercourse Acts made the federal government the main point of access to acquire 
and then distribute Native nations’ lands and required it to manage a federal land system that included surveyors, a 
Land Office, and making government grants to states and other entities. This organization also explains why, as 
Linklater describes, settlers, squatters and speculators, all had to wait to buy land, even if they have already entered 
onto tribal lands, from the federal government. Many states, however, violated these Acts by continuing to purchase 
land directly from tribes that, leading to litigation in the late 20th century that lasted for decades and ended with a 
decision in 2005 dismissing tribal claims on the basis of laches doctrine. See Oneida Indian Nation v. County of 
Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974) (Oneida I); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985) (Oneida 
II); Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 544 U.S. 197 (2005). The Oneida cases are discussed in Singer et 
al., Property Law, 102-103. 
42 Jerry Anderson and Daniel Bogart, Property law: Practice, Problems, and Perspectives, Second Edition (New 
York: Wolters Kluwer, 2019) 17.  
43 See Hernando De Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else 
(2000) 49-51, 61-62 ff. “Although they are established to protect both the security of ownership and that of 
transactions, it is obvious that Western systems emphasize the latter. Security is principally focused on producing 




rooted, too, in the historical context of conquest: if the Discovery Doctrine promoted 
colonization, colonization was an economic endeavor that enriched Europe collectively and in 
the British colonies, produced new forms of property that would become the basis of the market 
worldwide. The land market motivated the colonies to revolt from Britain and supported the 
United States’ survival and growth into a dominant world power. No parcel of land acquired 
monetary value on this market without the removal of Native people and the extinguishing of 
Native claims, actual or projected: the production of its value depended, in other words, upon 
white presence and the racial structure of conquest. 
Marshall was clear about both the racial structure of discovery and the racial justification for 
conquest: as he explained, “the character and religion of inhabitants afforded an apology for 
considering them as a people over whom the superior genius of Europe might claim an 
ascendancy.”44 The principle of first in time applied only to Europeans, presenting a tiering of 
humanity that appears to make Marshall himself uncomfortable, and to call claims under the rule 
“extravagant” and “pompous.”45 Dukeminier similarly calls this structure “discomfiting,”46 and 
explains that “prior possession by aboriginal populations (which were sometimes called savage 
populations, or semi-civilized ones), was commonly thought not to matter.”47 The racial 
character of conquest, however, as I noted above, presents a matter of greater importance than an 
opportunity for apology or condemnation. As I described above, it is substantively, structurally 
important to the holding. The devaluation of Native sovereign claims is denoted by the very term 
“discovery”48; the corresponding characterization of lands subject to conquest by European 
explorers as “virgin lands,” “vacant lands,” or lands available for taking.  
 
b) Labor Theory 
 
The labor theory is an alternative theory of acquisition used to justify property interests that 
comprises the relatively intuitive idea that if you put your labor or sweat equity into an object or 
land, it should become yours. Though most property law courses teach the theory of labor and 
investment as a source of entitlement using the case INS v. Associated Press, the topic presents 
an opportunity to teach about one of the most important and long-lasting ideological formations 
to justify the colonization of America. In my unit on labor, students read excerpts of John 
Locke’s Second Treatise and legal scholar Stuart Banner’s How the Indians Lost Their Land to 
build on their understanding of the land system, the discovery doctrine, and the recording 
system. I also place my class on slavery in this unit, since colonists developed property in people 
to supply labor to support territorial expansion; the trade furthermore presents a glaring 
institutional contradiction to the labor theory, highlighting the applicability of this principle, like 
the rule of Discovery, was to Europeans only. 
Most students have heard of John Locke and may know that he had a huge impact on the 
Founders, and in particular Jefferson, who drew on heavily on his writings to draft the 
Declaration of Independence. Few however know his biography: Locke was an aide to the Earl 
of Shaftesbury, an original proprietor of the Carolinas, wrote the Fundamental Constitutions of 
 
44 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573;  Singer et al., Property Law, 10.. 
45 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 590;  Singer et al., Property Law, 13. 
46 Jesse Dukeminier, James Krier, Gregory Alexander, Michael Shill, Lior Strahilevitz, Property (New York: 
Wolters Kluwer, 2018), 12.  
47 Dukeminier et al., Property, 12. 




Carolina and its agrarian laws, as well as a reform proposal for Virginia in 1696, and wrote many 
other memoranda and policy recommendations for the board of trade on the various colonies, 
settlement projects, and the institution of government and property in America; he served as 
secretary to the Board of Trade, the part of the English government responsible for colonial 
administration, during the 1670s, and was an investor in the Company of Merchant Adventurers 
to trade with the Bahamas and the Royal Africa Company (the Crown’s monopoly on the 
English slave-trade until the late seventeenth century).49 His Second Treatise chapter on Property 
reflects his knowledge about and real material interests in the colonies, as well as the main, 
widely taught justifications for rewarding labor—namely, desert, distributional equity, and 
efficiency/preventing waste.  
I also draw on Locke’s chapter and excerpts from Banner to discuss Native property rights. 
Locke’s passages about Native people articulate the idea that they, like others, have property 
rights that derive from labor: if they give chase to and kill a deer, for example, they get the deer. 
However, colonists did not recognize Native people’s labor on the land, to conclude that in 
America, “lands lye wast and free.” Different factors, including the devastation caused by 
disease,50 agricultural practices involving crop rotation, and the preservation of hunting grounds, 
produced the idea that “Native occupancy did not involve sufficient “labor” to perfect a 
“property interest.”51 It is easy to highlight the continuing pattern of discounting Native presence 
and sovereignty, according to the logic of the Discovery Doctrine, that produced the idea that 
land in America was available, lying waste, and free: e.g. Native labor on the land is not “labor”; 
Native use of land is not “use.” The idea that the land was vacant and unused in turn produces 
the abstract rationales traditionally associated with the labor theory: colonists deserved the land, 
needed the land (distribution), improved and made efficient use of the land, rather than wasting it. 
These ideas perfectly correspond to endless examples of ways that colonists justified their 
occupation of Native nations’ lands52; William Penn called it “waste or uncultivated Country,” 
and Samuel Purchas, for example, argued: “if any Countrey be not possessed53 by other men, 
every man by Law of Nature and Humanitie hath right of Plantation.”54 As Banner notes, 
“Everyone knew that land could still be owned [in England] even if it was not being farmed, and 
indeed even if it was not being used or occupied at all.”55 He asks why land in North America 
should be any different; the answer, of course, is given by the racial structure of the Discovery 
Doctrine: the rule explicitly provides that it is different to deal with Native people than other 
Europeans. 
The Banner reading provides an opportunity to return to the question of how the English 
“consummated” their title to take actual possession, as well as the point that the Native “right of 
occupancy” that Marshall delineated in Johnson was a fairly new idea in 1823: before about 
 
49 Stuart Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier (2005) 47 ff. Armitage; 
50 Singer et al., Property Law, 3 Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land, 29. 
51 Dukeminier et al., Property, 16 (commenting on Locke’s perception of Native labor), quoting Robert A. Williams, 
“The Medieval and Renaissance Origins of the Status of the American Indian in Western Legal Thought,” 57 S. Cal. 
L. Rev. 1, 3 n.4 (1983).  
52 And also contemporary rationales for gentrification. See, e.g. Nima Shirazi and Adam Johnson, “The Real Estate 
Page As Colonial Dispatch,” November 8, 2017, in Citations Needed, podcast, MP3 audio, 
https://citationsneeded.libsyn.com/episode-15-the-real-estate-page-as-colonial-dispatch.  
53 In anticipation of the class on possession, it is worth noting that the concept was a part of the Rule of Discovery 
and also a part of the theory of Labor. 
54 Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land, 31.  




1790, many colonial officials and private individuals paid indigenous people to purchase huge 
tracts of land, cultivated, or not.56 The question Banner poses of why the English recognized 
Native property rights during the early period through purchase is worth devoting some time to, 
as it focuses the question on the nature of a property right. Banner provides a range of answers: 
1) tribes clearly had property; 2) colonists did not have sufficient power to take tribal lands by 
force; 3) the English were competing with the French, who purchased land from tribes; 4) 
colonists found that they could purchase land from Native people cheaply.57 Further, because 
English entitlements came in this way to rest on Native title, the settled expectations of colonists 
functionally depended on the validity of Native peoples’ ability to sell.58 Banner makes clear, 
too, that English people did not need to respect Native people in order to respect Native property 
rights, in keeping with the hierarchical order of the Discovery Doctrine.59 Banner usefully builds 
on this point to focus on the very nature of a property right, arguing that, as a matter of practice, 
“There is no actual difference between respecting others’ property rights and treating them as if 
one is respecting their property rights. That’s what a property right is—the knowledge that one 
will be treated as a property owner.”60  
 Locke’s text is also useful for underscoring a conception of land that homologizes it to 
other forms of chattel property: cultivating land is like gathering an acorn or hunting a deer. This 
equivalence denotes a breakdown of the ancient English distinction between real property and 
chattel property that was remarkably new during the colonial period. For centuries, English 
property law regarded land and moveable goods as essentially unlike. Land was treated very 
distinctly because of its unique characteristics that sustain life; common interests in rivers, lakes, 
forests, shorelines, that make it difficult to conceive of these entities, or a part of them, as being 
owned by one person. Neither do the character of land nor mundane and long term 
environmental changes respect the survey’s neat boundaries that separate one person’s 
ownership rights from another: as lessons on nuisance law will later highlight, water and air 
move particles and objects across boundaries as a matter of course. In particular, chattel 
property, but not real property, had long been liable to seizure for the nonpayment of debts.61 
Though mortgages were common, failure to pay debts resulted in divisions of interests that no 
longer exist in the same way, such as the owner’s loss of usufructual rights, or the right of a 
lender to take possession of a property and harvest the fruits and rents of land.62 The enclosure of 
common fields was a relatively new development during the period of colonization in England 
too. Against the tendency to justify colonial action on the basis of supposed cultural and practical 
 
56 Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land, 33. 
57 Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land, 34-39. 
58 Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land, 41-42. E.g., When Edmund Andros, governor of the Dominion of New 
England, reversed previously settled policy by invalidating all titles that could not be traced back to government 
grant, he caused a “storm of protest” from New Englanders, leading to a group of Bostonians to declare that  if 
purchase from Indians could not serve as the root of a valid land title, “no Man was owner of a Foot of Land in all 
the Colony.” 
59 Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land, 42. Banner notes that the NY Council commented in 1674 that “the 
usuall practice” was “to give their Indians some recompence for their land & so [the landowner] seems to purchase it 
of them, yet that is not done for want of sufficient title from the King.” His account emphasizes the function of 
recognizing property rights: colonists believed that paying Native people was a matter of “prudence & Christian 
charity lest otherwise the Indians might have destroyed the first planters.” 
60 Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land, 42. 
61 K-Sue Park, “Money, Mortgages, and the Conquest of America,” Law & Social Inquiry Vol. 41, Issue 4 (2016): 
1007-1008.  




difference between colonists and Native peoples, Banner usefully describes the similarities 
between Native property arrangements and old English commons: villages claimed large areas of 
land, chiefs allocated plots for farming to families, based on size and need, and unallocated lands 
were available to all members of the community for harvesting fruit, wood, etc. The town 
planted fields together; but family plots were distinguished by narrow strips of grass.63 While the 
ideas of boundaries themselves were not new,64 enclosures evolved in America to serve the novel 
idea that “individuals possess all the resources within a given area of land,”65 in large part 
because of the idea, discussed above, that land was “unlimited,” “available,” and there for the 
taking. 
U.S. law has rewarded only certain kinds of labor, incentivizing particular types of work and 
not others. Historically, colonial governments and the United States created laws to recognize, 
reward and encourage immigration and the labor of settlement.66 Under headright systems, they 
promised people land on the condition that they clear, cultivate, occupy, and defend it. The use 
of such incentives to create value in land is apparent in the famous Homestead Act of 1862, as 
well as its predecessor and progeny legislation. This long legislative tradition, which continues to 
today, presents the opportunity to make two points: 1) the government played a major role in 
encouraging and managing the settlement of lands, territorial expansion, and building the land 
market; and 2) the collective project of settlement was also a project of removal. Dukeminier’s 
casebook includes a good note on work by legal scholar Eric Kades, who described this effect of 
settlement in great detail, and focuses on how settlement facilitated the government’s purchase of 
land from tribes: “A native population decimated by sickness and deprived of sources of food 




The idea that one’s possession of something justifies their continued possession of it, in the 
context of the colonization and settlement of America, is closely related to both the Discovery 
Doctrine and the labor theory. The importance of taking actual control68 is apparent in the 
Discovery Doctrine’s requirement for “consummating title”; “labor,” or English settlers’ 
cultivation and enclosure of lands, over and against Native occupation, was a means of taking 
 
63 Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land, 37-39. 
64 Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land, 43-44, quoting Roger Williams: “The Natives are very exact and 
punctuall in the bounds of their Lands. And I have knowne them make bargaine and sale amonst themselves for a 
small piece, or quantity of ground.”  
65 Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land, 37. 
66 Singer et al., Property Law, 104-106 (discussing Government Grants, such as the Homestead Act and land grants); 
see also Singer et al., Property Law, 106 (discussing the Pike River Claimants Union and their constitution, which 
wrote that “…and as Government has heretofore encouraged emigration by granting pre-emption to actual settlers, 
we are assured that our settling and cultivating the public lands is in accordance with the best wishes of 
Government…”).  
67 Dukeminier et al., Property, 17, discussing legal scholar Eric Kades, “The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. 
M’Intosh and the Expropriation of American Indian Lands,” 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1065 (2000).  
68 The classic case Pierson v. Post is useful for clarifying this requirement of possession. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 
175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. 1805). Property law scholar Bethany Berger’s indispensable article about the case 
examines the contest over lands that was its historical context to highlight the fallacy of “vacant lands” at the root of 
the Property Law myth that the field’s central problem is how to recognize ownership interests in a world of 
“unowned things.” Bethany R. Berger, “It’s Not About the Fox: The Untold History of Pierson v. Post, 55 Duke L. 




actual control or possession. Individual possession that preceded title supplied essential labor for 
the colonization project69-- again, settlers spread European diseases against which tribes had no 
immunity, cleared land, and hunted prodigiously to get hides and fur.70   
During the historic process of colonization, settlers usually entered into Native nations’ 
territory, encouraged by government incentives, before the government made its formal claims to 
title of those lands, as Linklater,71 Banner, and casebook authors discuss.72 The government 
legislation that encouraged possession therefore, in practice, worked somewhat retroactively and 
in marked contrast to its theory.73 In theory, for example, the Trade and Intercourse Acts, by 
giving the government the prerogative to formally acquire lands from tribes, suggested a 
sequence of acquisition, followed by survey, and distribution to individuals who would settle 
lands. In actuality, it was common for private individuals to enter tribal territory and attempt to 
settle it first; their labor made acquisition easier for the federal government, who followed to 
pursue formal cessions that would allow it to then distribute claims to the individuals and reward 
them for their labor.74  
This process of settlement helps to explain the theory of possession: actual possession 
facilitated government acquisition of Native lands. Additionally, just as a theory of “Discovery” 
justified colonists in embarking on the process of conquest, and a theory of “labor” justified their 
claims to the land while they were in the process of settlement, once they took actual control of 
lands, the theory of possession justified their continuing control of it. This dynamic also denotes 
some degree of coordination between individuals and governments during the process of 
westward expansion; the interests of American officials, who were generally also investors, 
speculators, and settlers, aligned in acquiring land quickly and cheaply from tribes so it could be 
resold at a profit.75 When individuals spread into Indian Country aggressively, they placed 
pressure on the federal government, who could only avoid war by following to purchase land.76 
Each acquisition of new territory only led to more settlement and pressure from the settlers for 
the federal government to acquire even more land, causing Secretary of State Timothy Pickering 
to point out that expansion driven by this dynamic would have essentially no limit.77  
The act of taking collective possession of lands also changed settlers’ conception of Native 
property rights. Banner describes a strong shift between the colonial period, when direct 
purchases from tribes were common, to the limited right of occupancy Marshall described in 
 
69 As the Dukeminier casebook writes: “Professor Kades argues that the settlers' objective was efficient 
expropriation; they wanted to get land at the least cost to themselves, with cost defined broadly to include lives lost 
in battle, diversion of capital to military production, and so on. In this light, purchase was often the cheapest 
course.” Dukeminier et al., Property, 17, discussing Eric Kades, “The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. M’Intosh 
and the Expropriation of American Indian Lands, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1065 (2000).  
70 Dukeminier et al., Property, 18. 
71 Settlers moved West ahead of the survey: “The race that developed between surveyors and squatters marked the 
entire history of the land survey, and it was rare for a surveying team to measure productive country that had no 
settlers at all.” Linklater, Measuring America, 163. 
72 “Settlers resisted federal policy, occupying federal lands before formally purchasing them,” Singer et al., Property 
Law, 105.  
73 Robert Nichols has called this logic “recursive.” See Robert Nichols, “Theft Is Property! The Recursive Logic of 
Dispossession,” Political Theory 46 no.1  (2018).   
74 To emphasize the government role again, Linklater describes successive land legislation that lowered the price 
and minimum sizes of parcels for purchase that made land increasingly accessible to individual settlers who 
performed this labor. Linklater, Measuring America, 164. 
75 Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land, 124.  
76 Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land, 124-125. 




Johnson: by the time of Johnson, he points out, there was no longer a strong belief in Native 
people owned the land; Anglo-Americans felt, rather, that the land was already theirs,78 
illustrating how the Discovery Doctrine distributed entitlements in such a way that dealing with 
Native claims became a matter of removing an obstacle, a means to an end. Changes in treaties 
with Native nations also indicated a shift in attitudes: where treaties had previously defined the 
boundaries of what tribes conveyed, the 1784 Treaty of Fort Stanwix with the Iriquois, for 
example, defined the boundaries of land not conveyed and assumed the Iriquois ceded all other 
lands. The idea that the Indians now retained no land other than what was given them by the 
grace of the government reflects a theory of possession, under which property rights stemming 
from control and dominion already achieved, as well as the different position of the United States 
vis a vis tribes since English expeditions launched under the Discovery Doctrine two centuries 
prior, and since settlers’ labor led to their occupation of most of the eastern seaboard.  
 The strong relationship between the activity of squatting and possession79 has no better 
doctrinal illustration than adverse possession. This history and this doctrine both raise the 
important question of when the government tolerates unlawfulness and incorporates self-help, 
even unlawful self-help, into law to create a property interest. 
 
 
B. The Slave Trade and the Resistance to Black Landownership  
 
1. Property in Enslaved People 
 
The class I teach on slavery gives students a brief overview of the institution that 
emphasizes its scale and the importance of this form of property to American wealth, growth, 
and political viability. Further, the racial social order that this major property institution 
entrenched in America is critical for explaining a huge proportion of the developments in laws 
and institutions governing interests in real property that followed abolition.80 All of the colonies 
developed some dependence on enslaved Africans to provide the labor they needed to work the 
lands they were so rapidly acquiring, especially in the South. In total, about 600,000 of the 12 
million Africans taken into captivity for the transatlantic slave trade were brought to mainland 
America. By 1790, there were about 700,000 enslaved persons in the United States, a little less 
than 20% of the total Black and white population at the time. The value of property in humans 
held across the colonies by 1774 was over £21 million81 (the equivalent of almost $3.2 billion 
today). By 1860, the enslaved population had grown by 580%, so that there were almost 4 
million enslaved persons in the US.  
The slave trade profoundly impacted the American property system, both by creating a 
tremendous proportion of the wealth in property that propelled its growth and increased the 
 
78 Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land, 124-29. 
79 The Singer et al. casebook has  a good section on the role of squatters. The chapter includes an excerpt from 
James Willard Hurst’s discussion of the 1836 Pike River Claimants Union, and the settlers’ explicit 
acknowledgment that although they had settled unlawfully, it was in reliance on the government’s incentives and 
promise to reward their labor. Singer et al., Property Law, 105-07, 108-09. 
80 Given the breadth and importance of this part of the history of property law, devoting one class to the subject 
highly compresses the topic. This section offers ideas intended to demonstrate how foundational this system was to 
the development of property law in general, and to improve upon a situation where frequently, property law 
professors do not address the subject at all. See supra, n. 1. 




power of the United States, and by entrenching racial dynamics in American society that 
practices of governing and regulating property in land would continue to institutionalize and 
maintain after abolition. Despite our knowledge of these facts, law professors continue to face 
epistemic difficulties in explaining how the trade in property in people shaped the American 
property system. One example of the extent to which we remain unaware of how the institution 
of slavery shaped the basic terms of the field is the pervasive use of the legal kadigans “White 
Acre” and “Black Acre” in property law casebooks, classrooms, and questions on the bar exam. 
While it is possible to find at least two uses of the terms in English legal treatises in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the terms spread most prominently across the United States 
after publication of an 1856 pro-slavery novel, White Acre vs. Blackacre, written in response to 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin, where in White Acre represents an incompetent northern farm and Black 
Acre is the name of a southern plantation labored upon by loyal, hardworking slaves.82 Further, 
property law courses address slavery at all—and frequently, they do not—the content of the 
lesson focuses on what moral limits the law should impose on the kinds of things we treat as 
property. However, the laws that facilitated the trade and accumulation of property in people 
reached beyond this conceptual question, and also beyond the laws that specifically governed the 
treatment and capture of slaves, which became obsolete with abolition.  
For example, as Justin Simard has recently shown, a full range of doctrines in not only 
property law, but also contracts, evidence, civil procedure, criminal procedure, statutory 
interpretation, and torts, among other fields, developed through their application to disputes 
concerning property in people, producing decisions that are still cited by courts in a majority of 
states, every federal court of appeals, and the Supreme Court.83 In order to emphasize the point 
that the slave trade was not only the focus of singular and dramatic constitutional events, but also 
everyday commercial law, I assign Bryan v. Weems, an 1856 Alabama case involving a claim 
that property in enslaved people had been wrongfully devised that invokes the principle of partus 
sequitur ventrem, the rule stating the status of the child follows the mother (see Timeline below). 
This case was used to teach statute of limitations and appeared in subsequent editions of 
casebooks by John Chipman Gray of Harvard Law School, Edward Henry Warren of Harvard 
Law School, and Harry Augustus Bigelow, Dean of University of Chicago Law School, between 
1888 and 1942. So that students may follow the facts more easily, it may be useful to teach this 
case after covering the basic forms of estates and the concept of devise.  
I designed my class on slavery in order to develop several themes already on the table at 
this point in the semester. First, I teach the 1825 John Marshall decision The Antelope because 
this decision shows that the slave trade, like conquest, operated within a larger framework drawn 
by international law and the Discovery Doctrine; again, the Portuguese slave trade launched 
under the authority of the doctrine as articulated in two papal bulls, the Dum Diversas (1452) and 
Romanus Pontifex (1455). It is easy to draw parallels between The Antelope and Johnson v. 
M’Intosh: in both decisions, students will be struck by Marshall’s moral equivocations and 
protestations that he is bound by positive law. I include the lesson within a unit on labor in order 
to point out that 1) the labor of enslaved persons, along with white persons’ labor of settlement, 
together made the colonies viable and productive and furthered territorial expansion and 
conquest; 2) slavery poses a major institutional contradiction to the labor theory of entitlement, 
 
82 William Burwell, White Acre vs. Black Acre. A Case at Law, (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1856); see also Park, 
“This Land is Not Our Land” (forthcoming 2020). 




starkly illustrating that the labor theory, like the rule of First in Time in the Doctrine of 
Discovery, followed racial lines, and applied to white Europeans only. 
In order to help students understand the temporal scope of its development and to provide 
context for the cases, it is extremely helpful to give students a basic timeline of the trade using a 
power point. I use the following timeline in my class, which contains the beginning point of the 
trade in the mainland colonies in America, its endpoint with abolition in the United States, and 
key developments that help explain the racial social order it produced and the international 




1619:  First enslaved Africans arrive in Virginia. 
 
1662:  Virginia passes law stating that “all children borne in this country shalbe held bond or 
free only according to the condition of the mother.”84  
Rule of Partus sequitur ventrem (lit. “off-spring follows the womb”) came to govern 
property in slaves across the colonies.  
- Contravened the English common-law rule that status followed the condition of the 
father. 
- This change, together with anti-miscegenation laws, tied enslavement to kinship, 
making the institution of slavery in this country uniquely racial. 
 
1772:  Somerset’s case confirms slavery on English soil was unsupported in English law, but  
slavery remained legal in most of the British Empire until 1833. 
 
1788:  Constitution Article I, section 9, clause 1: Congress not to prohibit U.S. participation in  
the international slave trade until 1808.  
 
1807:  The Slave Trade Act of 1807 restricted slavery across the British Empire; it prevented 
trading slaves but did not end slavery.  
The United States adopted an Act Prohibiting the Importation of Slaves, which provided 
for the abolition of its Atlantic slave trade and increased the importance of the domestic 
slave trade.  
 
1833:   Slavery Abolition Act ended slavery across the British Empire. 
 
1865: 13th Amendment passed, abolishing slavery in the U.S. 
 
In order to show how property law categories were mobilized and changed to create the 
novel form of property in people, I also review the history of experimentation in designating 
property in people as either chattel property or real property. As Thomas Morris put it, 
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How slaves would be categorized could be important to the slaves and would be to 
widows, heirs, legatees, debtors, and creditors. Would slaves be defined as realty or as 
chattels? Given the mobility and the humanity of slaves, the answer may seem obvious, 
but it is not, even though scholars normally refer to slaves as ‘chattels personal.’ In 
Virginia from 1705 to 1792 slaves were defined as real estate for some purposes. South 
Carolina tried to characterized slaves as real estate in 1690, when it followed the 
Barbadian code, but this was disallowed by the English Privy Council. In Louisiana 
slaves were designated as ‘immoveables,’ although sometimes the phrase ‘real estate’ 
was used. They were defined as realty for some purposes in Kentucky from 1798 to 1852 
and in Arkansas from 1840 to 1843. But that does not end the list. Some judges 
analogized slaves to land and adopted rules reflecting that correspondence. For one 
reason or another rules of real property law were applied to slaves in some instances in 
over one-third of the jurisdictions that made up the slave South.85   
 
These experiments underscore three important points. First, as the following quote from the 
Virginia jurist St. George Tucker of Virginia well illustrates, the experiments underscore the 
malleability and function of legal categories: 
the incidents to real and personal property, respectively, are merely creatures of the juris 
positive, or ordinary rules of law concerning them; and may be altered and changed o suit 
the circumstances, convenience, interest, and advantages of society… Thus in England it 
might be for the benefit of commerce to consider a lease for a thousand years, in lands, as 
a mere chattel; and in Virginia it might have been equally for the advantage of agriculture 
to consider the slave who cultivated the land as real estate.86  
 
Second, because property in enslaved people was extremely valuable and constituted a huge part 
of people’s assets,87 colonists used the real property designation to protect these assets from the 
rules governing property in moveable goods, which made chattel property liable for unsecured 
debts. Finally, the value of land and the labor of enslaved people became interdependent in the 
colonies, since each of these assets became essentially useless without possessing the other. 
Additionally, the possession of large estates made it possible for debtors to conceal enslaved 
persons from their creditors when land was protected from liability for those debts. When land 
did become liable for nonpayment of debts across the colonies in 1732, slave auctions became 
more frequent both because property in people could no longer be concealed on protected lands, 
and because land began to change hands more quickly, increasing the frequency with which 
people sought to acquire property in persons for labor. Consequently, I point out, during the 
colonial period, property laws changed to render both land and enslaved people into a form of 
property closer to chattel or personalty at the same time.  
   
 
C. Racism in the American Real Estate Market 
 
1. Resistance to Black Landownership 
 
85 Thomas Morris, Southern Slavery and the Law 1619-1860 (University of North Carolina Press, 1996.), 64. 
86 Morris, Southern Slavery and the Law, 65. 
87 See charts showing property in “slaves & serv.” made up around 20% of physical wealth in the thirteen colonies. 





It is crucial to emphasize that the slave trade entrenched ideological anti-blackness that 
profoundly shaped the social order of the colonies in addition to its material property 
formations.88 This racial ideology impacted the development of the real estate market, as I 
discuss below, by underpinning a long history of widespread resistance to Black landownership. 
I teach the 1838 Mississippi case Hinds v. Brazealle,89 involving the revocation of a deed of 
emancipation and bequeath of land to an enslaved person, together with a section from Berger, 
Davidson, Singer and Peñalver’s casebook on Freed Slaves, in order to highlight how the 
resistance that Brazealle illustrates translated into an enormous issue after abolition. In 1865, 
General Sherman issued Special Field Order No. 15 promising free people forty acres and later, 
mules; some formerly enslaved people took over plantations after the war. The arguments of 
freedpeople about their rights to the land—that “[t]he land ought to belong to the man who could 
work it,” not those who “sit in the house and profit by the labor of others”-- sound strongly in the 
labor theory and its ideas of fairness and desert. In a brief excerpt by Harriet Jacobs, describing 
her longing for a “hearthstone of her own,” even more for her children and herself, students will 
recognize how critical the issue of landownership is to the idea and experience of freedom in 
America.90 
In 1868, Andrew Johnson issued pardons to members of the Confederacy and used 
violence to remove former slaves and restore all their landed property. As a result, former 
plantation owners were able to run sharecropping systems that gave freed people very few 
options but to work for the same people who had enslaved them and under very exploitative 
conditions. Some emancipated Black people did become landowners by taking advantage of 
legislation such as the Homestead Act, or by purchasing land in the private market, where they 
encountered serious discrimination and predation. Yet resistance to Black landownership greatly 
intensified in scale after abolition, in ways that are crucial for understanding many of the most 
significant developments in property law during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
including the history of public accommodations law, to which I turn next.  
Finally, however, it is important to note that the long history of resistance to Black 
landownership implicates many property law topics that appear later in the course, and some that 
typically do not but provide excellent examples of the dynamics of development in America, 
historically and today. These topics include, for example, racially restrictive zoning laws,91 
racially restrictive covenants,92 contracts for deed,93 partition, which has been used as a tool of 
 
88 See the analysis of black codes governing non-whites as slave populations grew larger, for example in New York 
and Massachusetts: Leon Higginbotham, In the Matter of Color: Race and the American Legal Process. The 
Colonial Period (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1928), 80, 116. 
89 Brophy et al., Integrating Spaces, 42-44. 
90 Linklater, for example, describes how in America, land meant opportunity, possibility, freedom, a chance to take 
care of your family. Linklater, Measuring America, 175. 
91 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917), printed in Brophy et al., Integrating Spaces, 81. Southern Burlington 
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,  336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975), printed in Singer et al., Property Law, 
463. 
92 See Michael Jones-Correa, “The Origins and Diffusion of Racial Restrictive Covenants,” 115 Political Sci. Q. 541 
(2000); Richard Rothstein, The Color of Law: A Forgotten History of How Our Government Segregated America, 
New York: Livertight Publishing, 2017); Brophy et al., Integrating Spaces. 
93 This predatory and highly risky purchase money financing tool was widely used against the African-American 
community during the period of redlining. Beryl Satter, Family Properties (2009). Today, their use is on the rise 




Black land loss after fractionation that results from intestate descent of property, especially in 
rural areas,94 and property tax foreclosures in American cities.95  
 
2. Public Accommodations 
 
The topic of public accommodations, or the tension between an owner’s right to exclude 
unwanted patrons and the patron’s competing right of reasonable access, presents an excellent 
opportunity to elaborate on the thick relationship between property rights and American 
conceptions of freedom. Berger, Davidson, Peñalver and Singer’s casebook provides excellent 
material on the history of public accommodations. First, the authors track the shift from 
traditional, pre-abolition rule that places open to public had a duty to serve anyone who could 
pay96 (a rule much broader than the modern mandate applied to innkeepers and common 
carriers), to the proliferation of efforts around the time of the Civil War to legally segregate 
public space in anticipation of slavery’s imminent fall.97 After abolition, the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s equal protection clause and the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1870 each 
underscored the right of reasonable access to public places. In particular, the Civil Rights Acts 
articulated equal rights in terms of private law rights—not only as the right “to make and enforce 
contracts,” but also as “the same right as is enjoyed by white citizens to inherit, purchase, lease, 
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.”98 In other words, the nineteenth-century Civil 
Rights Acts constructed emancipated peoples’ new freedom in terms of rights to participate in 
the economy—not only in order to be able to secure shelter, subsistence, and other fundamental 
 
94 See Thomas Mitchell’s extraordinary work on the Uniform Heirs Partition Act. “Reforming Property Law to 
Address Devastating Land Loss,” 66 Alabama Law Review 1 (2014); “Forced Sale Risk: Class, Race, and the 
“Double Discount,” Florida State University Law Review, Vol. 37, 2010; “From Reconstruction to Deconstruction: 
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See Norman F. Arterburn, The Origin and First Test of Public Callings, 75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 411, 421 (1927) in Singer 
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human needs, but also to face liability for transactions undertaken toward those ends (“to be 
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind”). The 
emphasis, within this framework, on being able to transact for property underscores again how 
core property is to the construction of freedom in the society and economy of the United States.  
 The possibility of a robust right to participate in property transactions, however, was 
quickly narrowed after the Supreme Court struck down an 1875 public accommodations law that 
explicitly sought to regulate private actors in the Civil Rights Cases. The Court thereby 
introduced the state action doctrine, permanently cabining Equal Protection jurisprudence. This 
history of how the state action doctrine emerged is critical background for understanding the 
Court’s decisions in the landmark cases Buchanan v. Warley (1917) and Shelley v. Kraemer 
(1948), concerning racial zoning and racially restrictive covenants, respectively. It also provides 
an opportunity to underscore the consequences of the doctrine for the notion of freedom 
encompassed in the Civil Rights Act of 1866: what is left of the property right, after the state 
action doctrine, is the ability to purchase and own property or contract for services only if you 
can find a willing seller. This reduction of rights granted after the end of the Civil War ultimately 
resulted in the notorious decision in Plessy v. Ferguson and the era of Jim Crow, in a tide of legal 
subordination that did not turn until the Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education in 1954 
and the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  
Both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, passed to govern 
public accommodations pursuant to the Commerce Clause, concern individuals’ rights to access 
the marketplace and contract for goods and services, highlighting the essentially relational nature 
of property law. However, examining the two acts together, as Berger, Davidson, Peñalver, and 
Singer’s book allows you to do, further highlights the difference between the state’s attempt to 
ensure access through each law: on the one hand, the 1866 law’s creation of strong positive 
rights to transact for property, and on the other, the 1964 law’s delineation of narrow limitations 
on people’s right to exclude, on dominion otherwise considered to be fairly absolute. The CRA 
of 1866 was addressed to new citizens who had been barred from “the commons” and concerned 
their new affirmative rights in that space—to enter, receive equal treatment, and engage in 
commerce. By contrast, the CRA of 1964 is addressed to businesses and focuses on prevention at 
the margins: it identifies some limitations on the ways that some of those businesses can exclude 
people from their premises. The quick and successful efforts to diminish the robust property 
rights guaranteed by the CRA of 1866 in the wake of abolition highlights the extent to which 
efforts to create private rights for newly free people in public spaces was viewed as a major 
affront to private property. Accordingly, the opponents of the sit-ins, demonstrations, and 
litigation over public accommodations criticized the CRA of 1964 as violation of owners’ 
private property rights.99 However, the CRA of 1964’s shift to focus on the rights at the business 
owners’ end of the property relation, even if to limit and regulate them, still came at the expense 
of individuals’ ability to fully exercise newly granted rights of contract and property and 
ownership, and therefore, to live on par with other citizens. Viewed from above, this shift 
redistributed entitlements in a shared world to largely maintain the status quo with respect to 
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Conclusion: Race and the Production of Land Value 
 
This chapter describes the ways that the histories of conquest and slavery comprise an 
important part of the foundations of American property law, one that illuminates the ways in 
which developments in the colonies produced a property system distinct from England’s. Its 
scope has been limited to the histories of conquest and slavery that laid these foundations; it does 
not attempt to describe the longer, ongoing histories of colonization and resistance to Black 
landownership. Rather, its goal is to describe a framework for grounding the property law course 
in an understanding of the history and main justifications for property in America that will 
facilitate teaching the units of the course that follow—again, to establish a track upon which 
teachers may arrange their cars. Perhaps above all, this framework emphasizes the structure of 
the property system in which the English doctrines that traditionally appear in the course operate.   
history of the government creation of the survey and recording systems that underpinned the 
market in land enclosures is important background for understanding the federal government’s 
twentieth-century interventions to build, upon that foundation, a national mortgage market and 
secondary mortgage market. It is impossible to understand contemporary property—the real 
estate market-- without a basic understanding of the structure of these markets, which remain 
anchored by interests in land enclosures. 
Additionally, the history I outlined above shows how the racial violence of colonization 
and the slave trade produced the value of property in the American real estate system itself. The 
history of property that demonstrates structural reliance on racial violence to produce monetary 
value exceeds the histories of conquest and slavery that I have discussed here but begins with 
them. Specifically, the land had no monetary value on the colonial market until white people 
were present upon it and Native people removed from it. The monetary value of land then 
increased according to the extent to which whites established their claims to lands, developed the 
lands, and populated the lands in proximity to one another. The U.S. Census Bureau indeed used 
the density of white population as the measure to determine that the frontier had formally closed 
in 1890, when it found that there were no longer lands with less than two white people per square 
mile within the territorial boundaries of the nation. 
As I described above, after abolition, the concerted effort to suppress Black 
landownership followed a similar logic of raising the value of real estate according to the density 
of its occupation by white people. Without teaching this history, it is difficult to explain how 
white presence came to signify market desirability, why racial zoning laws were a major part of 
the history of zoning law, and why racially restrictive covenants were a major part of the history 
of real covenants in America. Furthermore, it is again essentially impossible to understand the 
structure of the contemporary real estate market without learning about how the Federal Housing 
Administration created a mortgage market by assuming lenders’ risk in issuing them, and 
transformed the American landscape by underwriting the construction of the suburbs. Yet there 
is no clearer example of institutional efforts that formally affirmed and raised real estate value 
because of white presence and diminished it because of non-white presence than the FHA’s 
notorious program of “redlining,” which delineated neighborhoods where the federal government 
would and would not insure mortgages based on the race of their occupants.100 The patterns of 
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white flight and the unequal distribution of government resources between the suburbs and the 
urban core constitute crucial background, further, for explaining the history of urban 
disinvestment. However, it is that disinvestment that underpins the urban renewal efforts that 
students will be familiar with from their own observations about what is happening in cities 
across the country, as well as cases from the second half of the twentieth century used to teach 
doctrines such as covenants and zoning in the property law curriculum101 and the vast racial 
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